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The Crumbling Wall Between Church
and State: Attorney General
Supervision of Religious
Corporations in California
By Erin M. Ryan *
Introduction
The First Amendment directly precludes the federal government,
and the individual states through the Fourteenth Amendment, from
making any law "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof."' The United States Supreme Court has at-
tempted to establish workable guidelines for the application of these
clauses to situations involving both religion and action or inaction by
the state. These guidelines, however, do not provide clear perimeters
for legislation touching on religion.2 In reconciling the requirements of
* B.S., 1979, Georgetown University; member, third year class.
I. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The California Constitution provides for the same prohibi-
tion in more specific language. "Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimi-
nation or preference are guaranteed. This liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are
licentious or inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. The legislature shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4. The free exercise
clause of the United States Constitution was first applied to the states through the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 3 10 U.S. 296 (1940).
The establishment clause of the United States Constitution was first applied to the states in
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
2. "[I]t is evident from the numerous opinions of the Court, and of Justices in concur-
rence and dissent in the leading cases applying the establishment clause, that no 'bright line'
guidance is afforded. Instead, while there has been general agreement upon the applicable
principles and upon the framework of analysis, the Court has recognized its inability to
perceive with invariable clarity the 'lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive
area of constitutional law."' Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 761 n.5 (1973) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)). See
also Zoetway, Excessive Entanglement: Development of a Guidelinefor Assessing Acceptable
Church-State Relationships, 3 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 279 (1976). "[T]he [establishment clause]
tests may have created a paradoxical constitutional requirement." d at 294. Section 9230
of the California Corporations Code, the subject of this note, provides a good example of the
problems encountered by legislatures in applying free exercise and establishment clause
principles. It was thought that when the original version of § 9230 was passed, it would
solve the First Amendment problems of the prior law. See Abbott & Kornblum, The Juris-
diction of the Attorney General Over Corporate Fiduciaries Under the New California Non-
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both the establishment and the free exercise clauses with statutory law,
courts have sometimes drawn tenuous distinctions, based on the de-
sired outcome in a particular case.
3
The California Legislature has fallen victim to the confusion sur-
rounding the free exercise and establishment clauses. One example of
this confusion is section 9230 of the California Corporations Code,
which involves state attorney general supervision of religious corpora-
tions in order to prevent fraud. The powers of the California attorney
general to act to prevent fraud by religious corporations have been re-
vised and substantially modified twice in less than two years.
This note is concerned with the statutory attempt by the California
Legislature to accommodate the free exercise and establishment clauses
in the revised version of section 9230,4 the most recent of three laws
defining the scope of the attorney general's jurisdiction to investigate
and prosecute criminal and civil fraud within religious corporations. 5
Traditionally, the attorney general held broad powers of charitable
trust supervision over religious corporations to remedy breachs of trust
by religious corporations.6 These powers included the injunction of ac-
profit Corporation Law, 13 U.S.F.L. REV. 753, 792 (1979); Hone, Caikfornia's New Nonprofit
Corporation Law-An Introduction and Conceptual Background, 13 U.S.F.L. REV. 733, 744
(1979).
3. For example, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the United States
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a 15% supplement to the salaries of private elementary
school teachers who taught only secular courses and used only public school materials. No
payment was to be made for any course containing any religious or moral teaching. This
practice was held to involve excessive governmental entanglement with religion. Only five
years later, in Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976), the Supreme Court
upheld a program of grants to private colleges, including those religiously affiliated. Al-
though in Lemon, nonpublic elementary schools were held to be substantially religious in
purpose, 403 U.S. at 616, in Roemer, colleges were held not to be "'pervasively sectarian,"
426 U.S. at 762. Limiting the use of state funds to nonsectarian purposes was enough to
guarantee that they would not be used to aid religion. Id at 759-60. The Court has also
drawn distinctions based on whether or not textbooks are loaned to nonpublic schools or to
the students themselves. Although loaning text books to students is constitutional, loaning
secular and nonideological instructional materials to nonpublic schools is not. Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). See also Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U S. 236, 243-44 (1968).
In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961),.the Court declined to require a sabbatarian
exemption to Sunday closing laws. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court
held that a state may not deny unemployment compensation to a Seventh Day Adventist
who declined, for religious reasons, to accept a position requiring work on Saturday. For a
critique of both decisions, see W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 98-100
(1964).
4. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9230 (West Supp. 1982).
5. The first statute was § 9505 of the California Corporations Code, which codified the
traditional power of the attorney general to supervise charitable trusts. CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 9505 (West 1977) (repealed 1980). For the full text of this section, see note 14 infra.
6. See Howland, The History of Charitable Trusts and Corporations in California, 13
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1029, 1036-37 (1966). In 1959, California adopted the Uniform Supervi-
sion of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12580-12597 (West
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tivities, the removal and substitution of trustees, the distribution of
funds, the restitution of funds improperly distributed, the cancellation
or revision of contracts, and the ordering of the winding up of the cor-
poration. The original version of section 9230,7 that is, the second of
three statutory attempts to regulate this subject, narrowed the scope of
the traditional powers but was criticized as an overbroad and excessive
regulation of protected religious activity in contravention of the free
exercise and establishment clauses.'
The California Legislature responded to these criticisms by repeal-
ing the original version of section 9230 and enacting a substantially
modified version of the statute in its place,9 even though no court had
yet ruled on the constitutionality of the repealed statute.' 0 Section
9230, as previously enacted, was in practical effect for only nine
1980). Section 12591 of that Act states, "The Attorney General may institute appropriate
jurisdiction of the court. The powers and duties of the Attorney General provided in this
article are in addition to his existing powers and duties." Id at § 12591 (emphasis added).
7. The original version of § 9230 was passed in 1978 as part of the overall revision of
the Nonprofit Corporations Law which took effect on January 1, 1980. Act of Aug. 29, 1978,
ch. 567, § 7, 1978 Cal. Stat. 1905, amended by Act of Sept. 14, 1979, ch. 681, § 1, 1979 Cal.
Stat. 2131, repealedby Act of Sept. 30, 1980, ch. 1324, § 3, 1980 Cal. Stat. 4617. Prior to that
time, the attorney general had traditional charitable trust supervision and enforcement pow-
ers over religious corporations to the same extent as over all other nonprofit corporations.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 9505 (West 1977) (repealed 1980). The statute did not provide any
guidelines or limitations for when such investigation was permitted or justified. "[fln the
absence of any legislative restriction, [the attorney general] has the power to file any civil
action or proceeding directly involving the rights and interests of the state, or which he
deems necessary for the enforcement of the laws of the state, the preservation of order, and
the protection of public rights and interest." D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11
Cal. 3d 1, 14-15, 520 P.2d 10, 20, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786, 796 (1974) (quoting Pierce v. Superior
Court, I Cal. 2d 759, 761-62, 37 P.2d 453, 460-61 (1934)).
8. The revision of § 9230 was actively promoted by the California Church Council,
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Church State Council, Church of
Scientology, California Catholic Conference, California Council for Religious Freedom,
and other church organizations. The new version of the statute was initially drafted by the
American Civil Liberties Union. Leo Pfeffer, well-known author and advocate of religious
freedom, strongly advocated the adoption of the new version. Mr. Pfeffer claimed to repre-
sent "the views of the 80 million Americans represented by the Protestant and Jewish orga-
nizations in whose behalf [he] submitted a brief amicus curiae to the United States Supreme
Court [in Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. Superior Court, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900
(1980)]." Hearings on S.B. 1493 Enacted into Law Sept. 1980 Before the Cal Legislative
Comm. Nov. 25, 1980 at I (statement of Leo Pfeffer) [hereinafter cited as Statement of L.
Pfeffer]. Mr. Pfeffer stated his opinion that the original version of§ 9230 was part of a "real,
if perhaps not officially declared, war against the [Worldwide Church of God]." Id at 9.
9. Act of Sept. 9, 1980, ch. 1324, § 4, 1980 Cal. Stat. 4617 (codified as amended at CAL.
CORP. CODE § 9230 (West Supp. 1982)).
10. The United States Supreme Court had recently denied certiorari to a petition by the
Worldwide Church of God claiming that the attorney general had acted unconstitutionally
in exercising his powers under the previous, and broader, § 9505 of the California Corpora-
tions Code. See Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. Superior Court, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
900 (1980).
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months. I One reason for the quick action by the California Legisla-
ture on this subject may have been strong pressure applied by religious
groups who, in the wake of the recent tragedy of Jonestown and the
People's Temple, feared increased public interest and scrutiny of their
affairs and practices. The 1980 revision of section 9230 severely cur-
tails the attorney general's power to investigate and prosecute civil
fraud within religious corporations. This curtailment by the legislature
has raised a different set of constitutional objections, in that the current
version, by narrowly circumscribing the power of the attorney general
to investigate and prosecute religious fraud, favors religious corpora-
tions over all other nonprofit corporations.
Recognizing the constitutional problems raised by the new law,
the legislature postponed the effective date of the new version of section
9230 from January 1, 1981, until June 1 of that year. This was done to
provide time for further study and analysis of the constitutional ques-
tions raised by the new section and to allow for amendment.'" That
time has now passed, and the problem remains. Religious corporations
continue to solicit billions of dollars of contributions from the public
with little or no accountability to anyone but themselves.13 While no
court has yet spoken on the constitutionality of either version of section
9230, review of the case law indicates that section 9230 fails to strike an
acceptable balance between the state's interest in protecting the public
welfare and the individual or corporate interest in the free and unfet-
tered exercise of religious beliefs.
This note first discusses the power of the attorney general to inves-
tigate and prosecute religious fraud both under the original section
9230 and under the current revision. It next examines the constitu-
tional implications of state interference with religious organizations.
The note concludes that in removing the provision dealing with viola-
tion of the free exercise clause in the old law, the revised section fails to
withstand scrutiny under the establishment clause. By exempting only
religious corporations from examination by the attorney general for
civil fraud, the California Legislature has unconstitutionally accorded
preferential treatment to religion over nonreligion. The final section
suggests a compromise that would achieve a constitutional balance be-
tween the individual's freedom of religion and the state's interest in
protecting the public from fraudulent activities that operate under the
guise of religion.
11. Although the revised version of § 9230 did not officially go into effect until June 1,
1981, the attorney general, upon passage of the revised section, dropped many cases and
investigations pending under the prior section because the legislature had demonstrated its
intent that he no longer act in this area. See note 50 infra.
12. Los Angeles Daily Journal, June 16, 1980, at 3, col. 8.
13. See note 50 infra.
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I. California Corporations Code Section 9230
A. History of Section 9230
Prior to January 1, 1980, the California attorney general's power to
supervise charitable trusts included authority over religious as well as
secular charitable corporations.1 4  Thus, when religious corporations
held their properties subject to a charitable trust, the attorney general
had full power to investigate for possible violations of that trust and to
appoint a receiver to control church assets and records during investi-
gation and prosecution.' 5 The statute did not provide any guidelines
suggesting when an investigation was permitted or justified-the corpo-
ration was subject "at all times to examination by the Attorney Gen-
eral.""6 Despite this apparent conflict with the free exercise clause of
the First Amendment, the statue was upheld as constitutional in 1977
by the California Court of Appeals in Queen of Angels Hospital v.
Younger. 7 The court held that "the [attorney general's role] is one of
neutrality. . . [and because] the dispute does not require 'the resolu-
tion by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and prac-
tice,' no infringement [of] First Amendment rights results.""' In its
analysis, the court made no distinction between religious charitable
corporations and all other charitable corporations. It reasoned that the
state was obligated to protect the public's interest in any charitable
trust and that only the attorney general, as representative of the state,
could properly represent the interests of the trust or the public.'9
In 1980, the structure of the Nonprofit Corporations Division of
the California Corporations Code was modified.2" Instead of being a
general nonprofit corporation law, the new statute classified nonprofit
corporations into three groups, with religious corporations receiving
14. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9505 (West 1977) (repealed 1980). The section read, "A non-
profit corporation which holds property subject to any public or charitable trust is subject at
all times to examination by the Attorney General, on behalf of the State, to ascertain the
condition of its affairs and to what extent, if at all, it may fail to comply with trusts which it
has assumed or may depart from the general purposes for which it is formed. In case of any
such failure or departure the Attorney General shall institute, in the name of the State, the
proceedings necessary to correct the noncompliance or departure." Id
15. Id For a discussion of general receivership powers of the attorney general, see
Note, Receivers, Churches and Nonprofit Corporations.- A First Amendment Anaysis, 56 IND.
L.J. 175 (1980).
16. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9505 (West 1977) (repealed 1980).
17. 66 Cal. App. 3d 359, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1977).
18. Id at 369, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 42 (quoting Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393
U.S. 440, 449 (1969)).
19. Id at 365, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
20. Act of Aug. 29, 1978, ch. 567, 1978 Cal. Stat. 1740 (operative Jan. 1, 1980) (codified
as amended at CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5000-10856 (West Supp. 1982)).
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separate treatment.2' While nonprofit public benefit corporations and
nonprofit mutual benefit corporations continue to be covered by provi-
sions virtually identical to the general charitable trust provision of the
old law,22 the provision for attorney general supervision of religious
corporations was made considerably more restrictive.
Prior to its repeal and substitution, subdivision (a) of the original
version of section 9230 permitted the attorney general to investigate
religious corporations if he had reasonable grounds to believe that one
or more of five specific conditions had occurred or existed.23 The attor-
ney general could examine the religious corporation to determine if-
21. The legislature divided nonprofit corporations into three classifications: public ben-
efit corporations (organizations intended to carry out public or charitable purposes), CAL.
CORP. CODE §§ 5110-6910 (West Supp. 1982); mutual benefit corporations (organizations
intended not to distribute profits), CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 7110-8910 (West Supp. 1982); and
religious corporations (organizations formed primarily or exclusively to further religion),
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 9110-9690 (West Supp. 1982).
22. Attorney general supervision of public benefit corporations is covered by § 5270 of
the California Corporations Code, and supervision of mutual benefit corporations is now
covered by § 7240 of the same code.
23. The original version of § 9230, Act of Aug. 29, 1978, ch. 567, § 7, 1978 Cal. Stat.
1905, amendedby Act of Sept. 14, 1979, ch. 681, § 1, 1979 Cal. Stat. 2131, reads as follows:
"(a) Upon reasonable grounds to believe that the following condition or conditions have
occurred or do exist, the Attorney General may, at reasonable times, examine a corporation
to determine whether:
"(1) The corporation fails to qualify as a religious corporation under this part; or
"(2) There is or has been any fraudulent activity in connection with the corporation's
property; or
"(3) Any corporate property is or has been improperly diverted for the personal bene-
fit of any person; or
"(4) Property solicited and received from the general public, based on a representa-
tion that it would be used for a limited purpose other than general support of the corpora-
tion's religious activities, has been improperly used in a manner inconsistent with the stated
purpose for which the property was solicited; or
"(5) There has been a substantial diversion of corporate assets from stated corporate
purposes.
"(b) Such examination shall respect privileges enumerated in Dih ision 8 (commencing
with Section 900) of the Evidence Code and shall protect the confidential nature of member-
ship lists by using such lists only in connection with the examination and any subsequent
court proceeding. In addition, such examination shall not unnecessarily interfere with nor-
mal operations and religious observances of the corporation.
"(c) The Attorney General may institute an action in the name of the state to enforce the
right of examination set forth in subdivision (a).
"(d) For reasonable cause, the Attorney General may institute an action in the name of the
state:
"(I) To establish that the corporation fails to qualify as a religious corporation under
this part, and if a court so finds it shall enter an order that the corporation shall no longer
operate as a religious corporation under this part.
"(2) To correct any wrongful activity which has taken place in connection with or as a
result of any condition or conditions set forth in paragrah (2), (3), (4) or (5) of subdivision
(a)."
See Abbott & Kornblum, supra note 2, at 790-91.
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(1) it failed to qualify as a religious corporation under the revised reli-
gious corporations part of the Corporations Code, or (2) there had
been any fraudulent activity in connection with the corporation's prop-
erty, or (3) there had been improper diversion of corporate property
for the personal benefit of any person, or (4) property solicited from
the public for a specific purpose had been improperly used in a manner
inconsistent with the stated purpose, or (5) there had been a substantial
diversion of corporate assets from stated corporate purposes.2 4 Section
9230 required the attorney general to have reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that one of the five specified conditions existed. There was no
reasonableness requirement, however, for attorney general investiga-
tion of other charitable trust corporations.26
Section 9230 further required that in making the examinations the
attorney general observe the privileges enumerated in the California
Evidence Code. For example, the attorney general was forbidden to
interfere unnecessarily with the normal operations and religious ob-
servances of the corporation and was required to protect the confidenti-
ality of church records and membership lists.2 7
In spite of the restrictions placed on the attorney general in the
original version of section 9230, that version did not sufficiently protect
the weighty First Amendment rights involved. The important nature of
religious freedom requires that the state bear some inconvenience so
that those rights may be protected. The attorney general had excessive
discretion to interfere with the practices of religious corporations. He
exercised sole discretion in deciding when reasonable grounds existed
to believe that a violation had occurred. 28 This discretionary power did
not conform to the requirement that government officials be provided
with definite objective guidelines within which to exercise their discre-
tion when First Amendment rights are being infringed upon by state
action.29
Section 9230 also placed no restrictions on the degree of govern-
ment entanglement with religious corporations, 30 which the establish-
ment clause proscribes. Section 9230 was in effect for a very short time,
thereby limiting the opportunity for excessive entanglement; arguably,
24. See id
25. See id; Hone, supra note 2, at 744. By providing a standard of reasonableness, by
limiting the nature and scope of investigation and suit, and by mandating protections and
privileges for religious corporations, the legislature thought that the provisions would with-
stand any constitutional challenge. Id
26. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5250, 7240 (West Supp. 1982).
27. See note 23 supra. These requirements were not in the prior § 9505. See note 14
supra.
28. See note 23 supra.
29. See notes 82-85 and accompanying text infra.
30. For a discussion of the excessive entanglement element of the establishment clause,
see notes 120-28 and accompanying text infra.
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however, the potential existed for such excessive entanglement. 31
B. Current Section 9230
In 1980, the California Legislature repealed the old version of sec-
tion 9230 and enacted a new version in its place. 2 The new enactment
was intended to restrict what was thought to be the overly broad power
of the attorney general to investigate religious corporations. It was
feared that section 9230, as originally enacted, would become a tool for
persecution of unpopular religious fringe groups, particularly the bur-
3 1. The potential for excessive entanglement is all that need be shown. See, e.g., Wol-
man v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
32. Act of Sept. 30, 1980, ch. 1324, § 4, 1980 Cal. Stat. 4617 (codified as amended at
CAL. CORP. CODE § 9230 (West Supp. 1982) (effective June 1, 1981)). The new and
amended version reads as follows:
"(a) Except as the Attorney General is empowered to act in the enforcement of the
criminal laws of this state, and except as the Attorney General is expressly empowered by
subdivisions (b), (c) and (d), the Attorney General shall have no powers with respect to any
corporation incorporated or classified as a religious corporation under or pursuant to this
code.
"(b) The Attorney General shall have authority to institute an action or proceeding
under Section 803 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to obtain judicial determination that a
corporation is not properly qualified or classified as a religious corporation under the provi-
sions of this part.
"(c) The Attorney General shall have the authority (1) expressly granted with respect
to any subject or matter covered by Sections 9660 to 9690, inclusive; (2) to initiate criminal
procedures to prosecute violations of the criminal laws, and upon conviction seek restitution
as punishment; and (3) to represent as legal counsel any other agency or department of the
State of California expressly empowered to act with respect to the status of religious corpo-
rations, or expressly empowered to regulate activities in which religious corporations, as well
as other entities, may engage.
"(d) Where property has been solicited and received from the general public, based on
a representation that it would be used for a specific charitable purpose other than general
support of the corporation's activities, and has been used in a manner contrary to that spe-
cific charitable purpose for which the property was solicited, the Attorney General may
institute an action to enforce the specific charitable purpose for which the property was
solicited; provided charitable purpose for which the property was solicited; provided (1) that
before bringing such action the Attorney General shall notify the corporation that an action
will be brought unless the corporation take immediate steps to correct the improper diver-
sion of funds, and (2) that in the event it becomes impractical or impossible for the corpora-
tion to devote the property to the specified charitable purpose, or that the directors or
members of the corporation in good faith expressly conclude and record in writing that the
stated purpose for which the property was contributed is no longer in accord with the poli-
cies of the corporation, then the directors or members of the corporation may approve or
ratify in good faith the use of such property for the general purposes of the corporation
rather than for the specific purpose for which it was contributed.
"As used in this section, 'solicited from the general public' means solicitations directed
to the general public, or to any individual or group of individuals who are not directly
affiliated with the soliciting organization and includes, but is not limited to, instances where
property has been solicited on an individual basis, such as door to door, direct mail, face to
face, or similar solicitations, as well as solicitations on a more general level to the general
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geoning cult movements in California. 33
Section 9230, as presently enacted, significantly reduces the au-
thority of the attorney general to investigate and prosecute religious
corporations for civil fraud. The legislature has expressly removed the
attorney general's common law and statutory charitable trust enforce-
ment powers over religious corporations. 34 The attorney general re-
tains only limited powers of enforcement under criminal statutes and
under narrowly drawn technical compliance sections of the California
Corporations Code-for instance, he can enforce corporate filing re-
quirements and statutes dealing with falsification of corporate
records.35 Examples of these limited powers are described below.
Under the new law, the attorney general still has power to bring a
quo warranto action pursuant to section 803 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure. 36 The attorney general, under his quo warranto au-
thority, may obtain a judicial determination that the corporation is not
properly qualified as a religious corporation under section 9111 of the
California Corporations Code.37 The purpose of a quo warranto action
is to put the corporation out of business by requiring it to forfeit its
charter. Such a result, however, fails to accomplish one of the main
objectives of section 9230: to stop fraudulent actions by directors and
officers and to return misappropriated funds to a valid religious corpo-
ration. An action in quo warranto is further limited by the application
public, or a portion thereof, such as through the media, including newspapers, television,
radio, or similar solicitations.
"(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any individual rights of action
which were accorded under law in existence prior to the enactment of Chapter 1324 of the
Statutes of 1980.
"As used in this section, 'individual rights of action' include only rights enforceable by
private individuals and do not include any right of action of a public officer in an official
capacity regardless of whether the officer brings the action on behalf of a private individual.
"(1) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require express statutory authoriza-
tion by the California Legislature of any otherwise lawful and duly authorized action by any
agency of local government." Id
33. See note 8 supra.
34. For a discussion of the attorney general's common law and statutory charitable trust
powers, see note 7 and accompanying text supra.
35. See note 32 supra; CAL. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMM., REPORT BY THE DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE ON THE IMPACT OF S.B. 1493 ON THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ENFORCE-
MENT JURISDICTION OVER RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS (1980). The bill, introduced by State
Senator Petris of Oakland, was intended to repeal all common law and statutory powers of
the attorney general to prosecute religious fraud except those which it expressly granted in
the new § 9230. It reads, "This bill would repeal existing law and instead provide that ex-
cept as the Attorney General is empowered to act in the enforcement of criminal laws of the
state and except as specifically empowered by this bill, the Attorney General shall have no
powers with respect to any corporation incorporated or classified as a religious corporation."
S.B. 1493, 1979-1980 Regular Sess. (1980).
36. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 803 (West 1980).
37. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9111 (West Supp. 1982).
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of section 9111 of the newly modified California Corporations Code in
combination with the case law definition of religion.
Section 9111 states that "a corporation may be formed under this
part primarily or exclusively for any religiotspurposes."' 3  The United
States Supreme Court first attempted to define a "religious" belief in
United States v. Seeger.3 9 Seeger involved the claim of a conscientious
objector who sought exemption from military duty because of his reli-
gious training and belief. The Court in Seeger held that in determining
whether or not a particular belief is religious, a court should not in-
quire into the validity of the belief.4° Instead, it should examine
whether or not the "claimed belief occup[ies] the same place in the life
of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one
clearly qualified for exemption."'" The Supreme Court expanded the
definition of religion in terms of its function in the life of the believer 42
in Welsh v. United States.43 The central consideration in determining
whether or not a belief is religious is if it plays the role of a religion and
functions as a religion in the believer's life." In Welsh, this considera-
tion was held to include beliefs which were purely ethical and moral in
derivation.4 ' Although the Supreme Court has emphasized thefunc-
tion of such beliefs in the individual's life, California courts have also
attempted to define religion in institutional terms.46 "Religion" in this
context refers simply to a belief, not necessarily one concerning super-
natural powers; a cult involving an association openly expressing the
belief; a system of moral practice resulting from adherence to the be-
lief; and an organization within the cult designed to observe the tenets
of that belief. 47 Under either broad definition, almost any group can
38. Id (emphasis added).
39. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
40. Id at 184. "'Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the
proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to
some may be incomprehensible to others."' Id (quoting United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78, 86 (1944) (Douglas, J.)).
41. 380 U.S. at 184.
42. See Boyan, Defining Religion in Operational and Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L.
REv. 479, 487-88 (1968).
43. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). Welsh also involved conscientious objectors to war.
44. Id at 339.
45. Id at 344.
46. See Boyan, supra note 42, at 491-93.
47. Saint Germain Found. v. County of Siskiyou, 212 Cal. App. 2d 911, 916, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 393, 395 (1963); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673,
693, 315 P.2d 394, 406 (1957). See also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). More
recently, a federal district court in California applied an even more amorphous and vague
definition of religion. The court in Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 372 F.
Supp. 770 (E.D. Cal. 1974) stated, "Neither this Court, nor any branch of this Government,
will consider the merits or fallacies of a religion. Nor will the Court compare the beliefs,
dogmas, and practices of a newly organized religion with those of an older, more established
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qualify as religious, and therefore a quo warranto will fail.
Section 9230 also provides the attorney general with authority to
institute actions to prosecute violations of the criminal laws. Whereas
under the prior law, the attorney general could bring a civil action for
self-dealing, mismanagement, or improper diversion of corporate assets
without having to prove criminal intent, now prosecution must be for
criminal fraud only.4" Prosecution for criminal fraud requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a fraudulent intent
at the time the act was committed.4 9 Since the defendants in these
criminal prosecutions will most often be the directors of the religious
corporation, proof of the necessary criminal intent, particularly in the
context of religious corporations, will be much more difficult than in
the previous civil actions.5 0 For example, lack of concealment provides
religion. Nor will the Court praise or condemn any religion, however excellent or fanatical
or preposterous it may seem." Id at 776. The court in that case avoided the formulation of
a definition altogether and limited its reasoning to a negatively phrased finding that the
operations of the Universal Life Church were not "substantial activities which do not further
any religious purpose." Id See also Rakay & Sugarman, AReconsideration ofthe Religious
Exemption: The Needfor Financial Disclosure of Religious Fund Raising and Solicitation
Practices, 9 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 863, 877 (1978).
48. Some examples are theft, embezzlement, and obtaining property by false pretenses.
In addition, the attorney general may represent as legal counsel any other agency or depart-
ment of the State of California expressly empowered to act with respect to the status of
religious corporations or to regulate activities in which religious corporations engage. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 9230(c) (West Supp. 1982). The types of actions that can be brought under
this provision include quasi-criminal and technical compliance actions for falsification of
corporate records, CAL. CORP. CODE § 6215 (West Supp. 1982), for violations of filing re-
quirements, CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 6810, 9660, 9690 (West 1977 & Supp. 1982), and for theft
of corporate property, CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 6811, 6813 (West 1977 & Supp. 1982).
49. For example, to support a conviction of larceny, the defendant must have intended
to steal the property at the time he took it. If the intent arose after the act of taking, the
crime may be embezzlement or a lesser offense, but it cannot be larceny. CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 484 (theft), 503 (embezzlement), 532 (false pretenses) (West 1970 & Supp. 1982). Penal
Code § 20 states, 'To constitute crime there must be unity of act and intent. In every crime
or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal
negligence." CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1970). See People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 609
P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980); People v. Fewkes, 214 Cal. 142, 4 P.2d 538 (1931); People
v. Turner, 267 Cal. App. 2d 440, 73 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1968).
50. Upon the signing by the governor of S.B. 1493 (the 1980 version of § 9230), the
attorney general dropped several pending cases and investigations of religious corporations.
A summary of the dropped complaints was provided to the Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary on November 13, 1980. Among the allegations were: (1) A church official sold a $1.8
million Beverly Hills house, purchased and maintained by church funds, and pocketed the
proceeds; a church employee spent more than $2 million of church funds on travel, clothing,
jewelry, and other personal items in a three-year period; a church official is a partner in a
firm formed to lease airplanes to the church at a profit (People v. Worldwide Church of
God, Inc.), and (2) Synanon at various times distributed more than $500,000 to various
members without authority; Synanon made retroactive salary payments of $300,000 to cer-
tain officers and directors which, in fact, constituted a gift of foundation money; Synanon
gave the defendant Charles Dederich $500,000 as a pre-retirement bonus; twenty-five thou-
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a possible defense to the crime of embezzlement.-" Since defendants
will have control of the corporate records, they will have little need to
conceal their acts. 2
The attorney general also has the power to enforce a charitable
trust against a religious corporation "[w]here property has been solic-
ited and received from the general public, based on a representation
that it would be used for a specific charitable purpose other than gen-
eral support of the corporation's activities, and has been used in a man-
ner contrary to that specific charitable purpose."53 This provision is
less effective than it first appears, for the statute provides directors with
an escape clause. Once a director has been accused of improper diver-
sion of funds for purposes other than those specifically represented, he
may vary the use of property solicited from the public provided that he
has decided, in good faith, that it has become "impractical or impossi-
ble for the corporation to devote the property to the specified charitable
purpose."54 Again, the attorney general must prove the criminal intent
of the actor, which makes successful prosecution difficult.
II. The Constitutional Problem
A. Section 9230 and the Free Exercise Clause
The Supreme Court has held that although the free exercise clause
forbids the government from interfering with religious beliefs and
opinions, the federal government may regulate religious practices. In
sand dollars of church assets were spent for vehicles and other personal property for direc-
tors and officers (People v. Charles Dederich (Synanon Foundation)).
Complaints had also been made against the officers and directors of Faith Center, Inc.,
Sierra Christian Service Corp., Old Time Faith, Inc., Fellowship Ministries, Inc., and others
for misuse and diversion of corporate assets to personal use. CAL. SENATE COMM. ON JUDI-
CIARY, CASES DROPPED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL UPON THE SIGNING OF S.B. 1493 1-3
(Nov. 13, 1980) (summary of cases and complaints dropped by attorney general).
51. Section 511 of the California Penal Code states that "[ulpon any indictment for
embezzlement, it is a sufficient defense that the property was appropriated openly and avow-
edly, and under a claim of title preferred in good faith, even though such claim is untenable."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 511 (West 1970) (emphasis added). Almost any action can be justified
under a standard of "untenable good faith."
52. CAL. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, MEMO FROM R. THOMPSON TO MEMBERS OF
THE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMM. CONCERNING HEARING ON THE AUTHOR-
ITY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO INVESTIGATE RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS 3 (Nov. 13,
1980) [hereinafter cited as THOMPSON MEMO].
53. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9230(d) (West Supp. 1982).
54. Id
55. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). This broad statement of state
power to regulate religion has been qualified and narrowed in subsequent cases. See gener-
ally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Peo-
ple v. Fogelson, 21 Cal. 3d 158, 577 P.2d 677, 145 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1978); People v. Woody, 61
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Cantwell v. Connecticut,56 the Court applied this interpretation of the
free exercise clause to the states through the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Cantwell concerned the validity of a statute that required persons
to obtain a permit to solicit contributions for religious purposes. The
government agent who issued the permits was required to determine
whether or not the religion was "bona fide."57 The statute was held
unconstitutional because it authorized more than the regulation of reli-
gious conduct, actually requiring a judgment of the applicant's reli-
gious beliefs.58 Despite this limit on governmental power, the Court
warned, "Nothing we have said is intended even remotely to imply
that, under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit
frauds upon the public. . . . Even the exercise of religion may be at
some slight inconvenience in order that the state may protect its citizens
from injury."59 While Cantwell made clear that some governmental
infringement of the First Amendment's free exercise rights was permis-
sible,6" it was for later decisions to define the extent to which the state
could justify the regulation of religious conduct as being for the protec-
tion of the public welfare.
It was not until the early 1960's that the Court began to articulate
the permissible scope of governmental action that interfered with the
free exercise of religion. The Court applied both a "compelling state
interest"6 test and an "alternative means" 62 test to determine the con-
stitutionality of governmental regulation of activities under the free ex-
ercise clause.63
The Supreme Court, when first considering the extent to which
governmental action may justifiably infringe upon the free exercise of
religion, required that the state show a "compelling state interest," not
merely a rational relationship to some colorable state interest. In this
Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964); Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles, 27
Cal. 2d 232, 163 P.2d 704 (1945).
56. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
57. Id at 302.
58. Id at 303-04.
59. Id at 306.
60. "[A] state may by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the times, the
places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, and of holding of meetings thereon; and
may in other respects safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the community, with-
out unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment [due
process clause]." Id at 304.
61. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); notes 64-67 and accompanying text infra.
62. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). For a discussion of the alternative means
test, see text accompanying notes 68-71 infra.
63. See generally Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Develop-
ment, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381 (1967).
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highly sensitive constitutional area, "'[o]nly the gravest abuses, endan-
gering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limita-
tion.' "64 Later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,65 the Court imposed a heavier
burden upon the use of state police power that threatened the free exer-
cise of religion. In addition to showing a compelling state interest, the
state was required to apply a balancing test in which "only those inter-
ests of the highest order. . . can overbalance legitimate claims to the
free exercise of religion. 66 Under this balancing test, even a "compel-
ling" state interest may be required to give way to First Amendment
protection in order to prevent a significant infringement on free exer-
cise rights. The importance of the state interest must be balanced
against the importance of the right infringed upon. The burden is on
the government to show the existence of such a significant and compel-
ling state interest.67
In addition to the burden of proving a compelling state interest in
a particular regulation, the state must prove that there are no other less
offensive means it could utilize to accomplish its valid objective.6 8 Ad-
dressing the proper scope of a statute that interferes with religious prac-
tice, the Supreme Court in Braunfeld v. Brown69 explained, "[I]f the
State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power,...
the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance
unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not
impose such a burden. '7° Whenever a state seeks to regulate religious
activity, those regulations must be drafted as narrowly as possible in
order to survive scrutiny under the alternative means test. "[N]othing
. . . would prevent officials from proceeding with a program grounded
in a strong state interest so long as they have explored, and in good
faith rejected, seemingly less restrictive alternatives."'"
The California Supreme Court's protection of religious practices
under the free exercise clause of the California Constitution closely
parallels that of the United States Supreme Court.72 In addition to
applying the compelling state interest test and the balancing approach,
California case law distinguishes between purely religious and merely
64. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945)).
65. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
66. Id at 215.
67. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976).
68. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
69. 366 U.S. 599 (1960).
70. Id at 607. See also People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 723, 394 P.2d 813, 819, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 69,75 (1964).
71. Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1078
(1978).
72. See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 718, 394 P.2d 813, 815-16, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69,
71-72 (1964).
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secular activities of a religious group. While a compelling state interest
is necessary to regulate the latter, the state bears an even heavier bur-
den when attempting to regulate the former.
73
Religious organizations engage in a broad scope of activities, in-
cluding the operation of schools, wineries, hospitals, and various com-
mercial enterprises. Commenting on the use of state police power to
regulate the basically nonreligious activities of religious corporations,
the California Supreme Court wrote:
Conceivably [religious corporations] may engage in virtually any
worldly activity, but it does not follow that they may do so as
specially privileged groups, free of the regulations that others
must observe. If they were given such freedom, the direct conse-
quence of their activities would be a diminution of the state's
power to protect the public health and safety and the general wel-
fare. With that power so easily diminished there would soon
cease to be that separation of church and state underlying the
constitutional concept of religious liberty.7 4
The extent of the California requirement of a stricter showing of a
compelling state interest when the state attempts to regulate essential
and purely religious functions is exemplified in the decision of People v.
Woody.75 In Woody, the state's prohibition of the use of peyote in the
religious ceremonies of Native Americans was held unconstitutional.76
The court considered the following in'determining whether or not the
regulation impermissibly invaded the Native Americans' constitution-
ally protected religious exercise: (1) the extent of the burden on free
exercise, (2) the existence of a compelling state interest to justify the
infringement, 77 and (3) the possibility of accomplishing the state's ob-
jective by a less offensive means.78 The court found that prohibition of
the use of peyote would result in a "virtual inhibition of the practice of
defendants' religion."' 79 Although the court recognized the state's
strong interest in enforcing its narcotics laws, it was not convinced that
a means which did not single out a particular religious practice could
not be utilized to achieve that end.8 °
Although subsequent to Woody the California Supreme Court rec-
ognized that some governmental regulation of First Amendment activi-
73. Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 2d 232, 245-46, 163 P.2d 704, 712
(1945). See also Giannella, supra note 63, at 1384.
74. Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 2d 232, 245, 163 P.2d 704, 712 (1945).
75. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
76. Id at 727, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
77. Id at 719, 394 P.2d at 816, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72. See also Giannella, supra note 63, at
1394-95.
78. 61 Cal. 2d at 723, 394 P.2d at 819, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
79. Id at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
80. Id at 723, 394 P.2d at 819, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
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ties is necessary and desirable,8" it has not relaxed the requirement that
the least offensive means be employed. 2 Furthermore, state officials
must have "definite, objective guidelines" 3 within which to exercise
their discretion.84 Especially to be protected, in the court's view, are
First Amendment freedoms, including constitutionally protected forms
of solicitation, for which "the touchstone of regulation must be preci-
sion-narrowly drawn standards closely related to permissible state
interests."8"
Once the state proves that it has a compelling state interest and
that it has chosen the least offensive means to accomplish its objective,
the state may constitutionally regulate the practices of religious groups.
Indeed, the public interest in safety will often require such regulation.
Proponents of the revised section 9230 recognize the state's interest
in protecting the public against fraud and breach of trust by the direc-
tors of religious corporations. They do not, however, believe that the
means provided by the original version of the section were properly
tailored so as to infringe First Amendment rights as little as possible.86
They contend that the attorney general's power was too broad and too
discretionary, and that prosecution only under the criminal laws pro-
vides the necessary safeguard of the public interest as well as an ade-
quate means with which to accomplish the state's objective.87
Although the original version of section 9230 may have given the
attorney general excessive discretion in determining the existence of
"reasonable cause" that a violation had been committed, 88 reliance on
the Penal Code reduces the state's power to protect the public welfare
from fraud in religious corporations. Is reliance solely on the criminal
law as a method for dealing with the problem of internal fraud a viable
"alternative means"? Conviction for criminal fraud requires proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a fraudulent intent at
the time the act was committed.89 The attorney general has stated that
to prove criminal intent, there must generally be evidence that the de-
fendant concealed his act." Since the defendant directors often have
81. People v. Fogelson, 21 Cal. 3d 158, 577 P.2d 677, 145 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1978).
82. Id
83. Id at 166, 577 P.2d at 682, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
84. The California Supreme Court has held that statutes which accord officials exces-
sive discretion are unconstitutional on their face. Id at 167, 577 P.2d at 682, 145 Cal. Rptr.
at 547.
85. Id at 166, 577 P.2d at 681, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
86. See note 8 supra.
87. Id
88. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
89. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
90. Cal. Dep't of Justice: Interim Hearings on S.B. 1493 (Petris): Impact of S.B. 1493 on
Attorney General's Enforcement Jurisdiction Over Religous Corporations Before the Assembly
Judiciary Comm. 3 (Nov. 12, 1980) (memorandum from state attorney general).
[Vol. 9:691
Spring 1982] RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS IN CALIFORNIA 707
complete control over corporate assets and books, there is no need for
their concealment of action9 '-particularly because the books are not
subject to public inspection and because the directors and officers have
the power to prevent even members from inspecting the annual reports
and coTorate records if they include such restrictions in the church
bylaws.
Only those defendants actually found guilty of a specific intent
crime are subject to the additional sanction of restitution. The objec-
tive of a civil fraud action, however, is restitution of misappropriated
funds to the corporation, assuming a valid religious corporation exists.
Under the new law, even though the primary sanction is criminal pun-
ishment for fraud, the courts are also encouraged as part of sentencing
"to exercise their authority to impose restitution as a means of compen-
sating the victims." 93 This remedy will be less effective than the prior
law because only a fraction of those who would be required to return
misappropriated funds under civil sanctions will be required to pay
under the criminal provision.94
Although the statute authorizes criminal prosecution by the attor-
ney general against religious corporations and their directors who are
engaged in fraudulent activities, there are no statutory provisions for
other individuals to institute civil actions for restitution. Under the
new Nonprofit Corporations Law, only "members," officers, and direc-
tors have standing to sue for misuse of church assets.95 "Members" are
those persons who under the corporate articles or bylaws have the right
to elect directors and to vote disposition of church assets upon dissolu-
tion.96 A religious corporation has no members unless the articles of
incorporation specifically provide for them.97 A membership is not re-
quired.98 In the absence of members, any action that might otherwise
require their approval requires approval only by the directors of the
corporation. Most of the congregations of religious organizations are
not "members" for purposes of the California Corporations Code.99
Even if the rank and file members had standing to sue, their ability
to bring civil actions is severely limited by the Corporations Code,
which requires the posting of an expensive security bond in derivative
91. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
92. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9511 (West Supp. 1982).
93. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9690 (West Supp. 1982).
94. Restitution as a sanction may be imposed only during sentencing of the defendant
following conviction. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9690 (West Supp. 1982).
95. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9243(c) (West Supp. 1982).
96. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5056 (West Supp. 1982).
97. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9310 (West Supp. 1982).
98. Id
99. THOMPSON MEMO, supra note 52, at 4.
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suits.' °° The individual's actual interest would likely be too small to
justify the cost of such an action. As a result of the revision of section
9230, civil fraud enforcement powers are effectively left in the hands of
the very persons who control, and who might most easily misuse,
church assets.
B. Section 9230 and the Establishment Clause
Proponents of the new version of section 9230 argue that the origi-
nal version of the section violated the establishment clause by allowing
"excessive government entanglement" with religion.' 0 ' The establish-
ment clause is intended to afford protection against state sponsorship
of, financial support of, and active involvement in religious activity.' T2
To withstand scrutiny under the establishment clause, the law in ques-
tion must (1) reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose, (2) have a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) avoid
excessive government entanglement with religion.'0
3
The first element of the tripartite test, that the law have a clearly
secular legislative purpose, has been little discussed; in only one
Supreme Court case has a law been found unconstitutional because the
legislature did not have a secular legislative purpose. 1 " In Epperson v.
Arkansas, °5 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute that
prohibited the teaching of Darwin's theory of evolution in public
schools.'0 6 The Court found that the purpose of the state in enacting
such a law was to suppress the teaching of a theory that denied the
divine creation of man. The Court stated, "It is clear that fundamen-
100. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5710 (West Supp. 1982) requires the posting by the plaintiff in a
shareholder derivative suit of a security bond of up to $50,000 upon motion by the defend-
ant corporation, officer, or director to cover reasonable expenses that may be incurred by the
defendant if successful.
101. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). For a discussion of the entan-
glement problems, see notes 120-28 and accompanying text infra.
102. Lemon v. Kurtzmen, 403 U.S. at 612. In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
(1947), the Supreme Court stated, "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. . . . No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious be-
liefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. . . . In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation
between church and state.'" Id at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
164 (1878).
103. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist. 413 U.S. 756, 772-73
(1973). See generally Note, Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Administrative
Aid to Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1175 (1974).
104. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
105. Id
106. Id. at 103.
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talist sectarian conviction was and is the law's reason for existence."10 7
Objections to government aid of religion have arisen primarily under
the second and third prong of the establishment clause test.
The second element of the establishment clause test, that the law
have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
means, in effect, that a regulation specifically enacted for religious con-
siderations is unconstitutional, while one that has some impact on reli-
gion only incidental to its main purpose is valid.1 8 The establishment
clause does not prohibit governmental regulation of conduct "whose
reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the ten-
ets of some or all religions. . . Congress or state legislatures [may]
conclude that the general welfare of society, wholly apart from any reli-
gious considerations, demands such regulation."'' 0 9 In McGowan v.
Maryland," Io the Supreme Court thus upheld a Sunday closing law be-
cause the state had a legitimate secular purpose in providing its citizens
a uniform day of rest and because any benefit to religions whose Sab-
bath fell on Sunday was purely incidental."I' The Supreme Court has
also held constitutional the state provision of textbooks to all school-
children, including children attending parochial schools, even though
parochial schools thereby receive an incidental benefit." 2 The Court
reasoned that such action is comparable to public provision of police
and fire protection, sewage facilities, and sidewalks. "3
A helpful analogy by which to explore the implications of the new
version of Corporations Code section 9230 is provided by those statutes
that establish tax exemptions for religious institutions. Walz v. Tax
Commission1 4 upheld the constitutionality of one such statute" 5 be-
cause there was a neutral secular justification for the exemption. Jus-
tice Harlan, concurring in Walz, noted that the tax exemption in
question applied not only to religious institutions but to a class of enti-
ties "whose common denominator is their nonprofit pursuit of activities
107. Id at 107-08.
108. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975). See also Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) (plurality opinion).
109. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
110. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
I11. Id at 442-44.
112. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968).
113. Id at 242.
114. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
115. The statute in question read, "'Real property owned by a corporation or association
organized exclusively for the moral or mental improvement of men and women, or for reli-
gious, bible, tract, charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary, educational, pub-
lic playground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical society, library, patriotic,
historical or cemetary purposes. . . and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or
more of such purposes . . . shall be exempt from taxation.'" N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1
(implemented in N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420(1) (McKinney 1971)), quotedin Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 667 n.l (1970).
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devoted to cultural and moral improvement and the doing of 'good
works'" in the community." 6 He stated that "[t]o the extent that reli-
gious institutions sponsor the secular activities that this legislation is
designed to promote, it is consistent with neutrality to grant them an
exemption just as other organizations devoting resources to these
projects receive exemptions."'" 7
The Court in Walz stressed the fact that statutory exemption for
religious institutions was part of a neutral regulation that applied to a
wide scope of public benefit activities. Any benefit to religious organi-
zations was purely incidental to the overall purpose of promoting so-
cially beneficial activities." 8 A statute that "confers an 'indirect,'
'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit upon religious institutions is [not], for
that reason alone, constitutionally invalid."" 19
It was in Walz that the Supreme Court first discussed the third
requirement for legislation consistent with the establishment clause.' 2
It is not enough that a law have a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; the law also
must not foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 2'
This requirement is similar in effect to the alternative means test as
116. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 697 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan
noted further that "[t]he statute by its terms grants this exemption in furtherance of moral
and intellectual diversity and would appear not to omit any organization that could be rea-
sonably thought to contribute to that goal." Id
117. Id
118. Other examples of incidental benefits to religion found constitutional by the Court
include (1) public transportation of all schoolchildren to both public and private schools,
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (the Court in Walz noted that the transpor-
tation of children to sectarian schools was constitutional as it was merely part of a plan to
aid all schoolchildren and their parents and any benefit to religious schools was purely inci-
dental, 397 U.S. at 670), and (2) the loaning of textbooks to all students in both public and
parochial schools, Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362 (1975); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 248 (1968) (the Court in Walz suggested that the furnishing of books to all school-
children be compared with the furnishing of police and fire protection, 397 U.S. at 671-72).
The California Supreme Court, in California Educ. Facilities v. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d 593, 526
P.2d 513, 116 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974), found constitutional an act providing a system of bonds
for all educational institutions because the bonds were available to all nonpublic institutions
of higher learning as part of a secular state program to provide expanded opportunities for
college education.
119. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771
(1973). See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws), in
which the Court stated, "[Tihe 'Establishment' clause does not ban federal or state regula-
tion of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the
tenets of some or all religions. In many instances, the Congress or state legislatures conclude
that the general welfare of society, wholly apart from any religious considerations, demands
such regulation." Id at 442.
120. While the principle was first enunciated in Walz, 397 U.S. at 674, the excessive
entanglement element was first used as an independent ground for unconstitutionality in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613-15, 625 (1971).
121. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612-14.
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applied under the free exercise clause. 122 An otherwise valid statute
promoting a secular legislative purpose will be declared invalid if it
causes excessive involvement by the government in religious activity.
Lemon v. Kurtzman,123 the first case to apply excessive entangle-
ment as an independent requirement, involved a challenge to the provi-
sion of state aid to, or for the benefit of, nonpublic schools. 124 The
statutes were found unconstitutional because they provided direct aid
to church schools and gave the state postaudit power to evaluate the
school's financial records in order to determine which expenditures
were secular. 25 The need for the state to inspect and evaluate religious
school records was described by the Court to be "pregnant with dan-
gers of excessive government direction of church schools and hence of
churches."'' 26 The Court recognized that some relationship between
government and religious organizations is inevitable and that total sep-
aration is impossible. For example, fire inspections, building and zon-
ing regulations, and state requirements under compulsory school
attendance laws are all examples of "necessary and permissible con-
tacts." 27 The Court noted that "[j]udicial caveats against entangle-
ment must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,'
is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the cir-
cumstances of a particular relationship."'
' 28
Critics of the original version of section 9230 argue that the statu-
tory framework of the prior law permitted excessive interference by the
attorney general in the internal functioning and religious practice of
religious corporations. 29 Supervision by the attorney general of all
corporations-including religious corporations-which may take the
form of police protection or building regulations, is a kind of public
122. For a discussion of the alternative means test, see text accompanying notes 68-71
supra.
123. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
124. The Court in Lemon noted that 95% of the children attending nonpublic elementary
schools in Rhode Island attended schools affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. Id at
608.
125. Id at 619-20.
126. Id at 620. See also New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977)
(state audit of classroom materials could result in excessive state involvement in religious
affairs).
127. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
128. Id
129. The primary complaint has been the broad power of the attorney general to appoint
and supervise a receiver to manage corporate assets and records while the investigation is in
progress. See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. California, 623 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.
1980). See also Note, Government Protection of Church Assetsfrom FscalAbuse: the Consti-
tutionaliqy of Attorney General Enforcement Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1277 (1980).
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welfare legislation.130  It is intended to keep the public free from
harm.13 1 Nevertheless, attorney general supervision is distinguishable
in that perpetration of civil fraud does not directly endanger the health
or safety of the public. Such supervision is not necessary to prevent
outbreaks of violence or disorder or to protect the physical well-being
of the community. Considering the large amounts of money solicited
each year from the general public by religious corporations, however,
the public interest is of significant proportions.132
Under the original section 9230, state interference with normal op-
erations and religious observances of the corporation was limited by
the vague standard of necessity. 33 Critics argued that "comprehensive,
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance"' 134 would be needed
to insure that religious organizations do not perpetrate civil fraud.
They also claimed that the remedial power of the attorney general to
appoint "a receiver to manage and control the operation of a church
reeked of excessive entanglement." 135
Some state interference is inevitable in the enforcement of a regu-
lation such as section 9230. The scope of the attorney general's inter-
ference, however, must be as narrow as possible to minimize
government entanglement with the internal operations of a religious
corporation. Determining the point at which entanglement becomes
excessive is not easy.' 36 With respect to section 9230, the California
Legislature concluded that the scope of the original section was not
130. In Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. California, 623 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1980), the
court stated, "Investigation and regulation of fraud in charitable trusts... is [a state] inter-
est of the magnitude of controlling welfare fraud . . . or regulating child custody." Id. at
616. See generally Rakay & Sugarman, supra note 47, at 884.
131. The existence of significant fraud in religious corporations is widely recognized.
See Rakay & Sugarman, supra note 47, at 886.
132. Religious charities solicited nearly $13 billion in 1976, half of which was allocated
for secular purposes. Id
133. See note 23 supra.
134. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971). In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1976), the Supreme Court found state funding of field trips for children in nonpublic
schools unconstitutional because to insure the secular use of funds, close state supervision of
the nonpublic teachers would be required. This would result in excessive entanglement. Id
at 254.
135. See Statement of L. Pfeffer, supra note 8, at 9. On three occasions, the United States
Supreme Court has declined to review state court decisions sustaining the receivership or
discovery orders relating to state litigation involving religious corporations: Worldwide
Church of God, Inc. v. Superior Court, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980); Rader v. Superior
Court, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 916 (1979); Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. Superior Court,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979). The case against Worldwide Church of God, Inc. was
dropped by the attorney general following passage of the new version of§ 9230. See note 50
supra.
136. There is no clear method to determine what constitutes excessive entanglement of
church and state. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 766 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion). Justice White, in his concurring opinion in Roemer, called the excessive entanglement
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sufficiently circumscribed to insure minimum government entangle-
ment with religious corporations. The new version attempts to solve
the excessive entanglement problem by drastically curtailing the attor-
ney general's power to investigate and prosecute religious corporations
under the civil laws of California. The establishment clause does not
prohibit all government entanglement with religion, however, only ex-
cessive entanglement. The entanglement problem is essentially proce-
dural, while the primary effect question is substantive. 37
Entanglement concerns the degree of governmental involvement with
religion that satisfies the primary effect and secular purposes tests.
Although the original version of section 9230 was criticized for fos-
tering excessive entanglement, the present version presents problems
under the application of the primary effect and the secular legislative
purpose tests. 38 The main theme stressed by the Supreme Court in
upholding state legislation from claims of violations of the establish-
ment clause has been the broad spectrum of activities receiving the
benefit-that religious organizations were receiving only an incidental
benefit as part of general social welfare legislation. 39 Section 9230, in
contrast, is a governmental regulation that has an impact only on reli-
gious corporations. 4 ° So-called religious, nonprofit corporations thus
have been singled out by the legislature to receive favorable
treatment. 141
Classification of a corporation as primarily religious removes it
from the ambit of civil scrutiny because section 9230 creates an exemp-
tion for religious corporations from examination by the attorney gen-
eral. Furthermore, the legislature has put forward no general secular
legislative purpose for enacting the new law restricting the attorney
general's powers. There is no overriding secular goal such as the im-
provement of the education system found in aid-to-religion cases such
as Board of Education v. 4llen' 42 or in the enforcement of narcotics
laws as in People v. Woody. 143 The only asserted justification for the
criterion both "insolubly paradoxical," id at 768, and a "'blurred, indistinct, and variable
barrier,'" id at 769 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
137. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755.
138. For a discussion of these tests, see notes 104-28 and accompanying text supra.
139. Even when the Court upheld Sunday closing laws in McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961), it stressed that there was a general secular purpose behind the law-to grant
everyone a day of rest. Although Sunday was originally the day of rest for Christian reli-
gions, it had become accepted by society in general as the day of rest irrespective of religious
beliefs. The benefit to Christians of keeping one uniform day of rest on Sunday was purely
incidental to the benefit to society of having a universally accepted day off. Id at 442-44.
140. All other nonprofit corporations are still subject to unlimited examination by the
attorney general. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
141. See notes 21-27 and accompanying text supra.
142. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
143. See notes 75-80 and accompanying text supra.
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legislation is the fear that supervision by the attorney general will be-
come a means for the persecution of religious cults rather than for its
proper purpose of investigating and prosecuting religious corporations
on good cause for civil fraud.'" Abusive prosecution, if indeed actu-
ally occurring, may be controlled in a manner more consistent with
First Amendment considerations. 145
One of the primary effects of the new Religious Corporations Law,
given the low threshold requirements for qualifying as a religious cor-
poration, 4 6 will be to encourage corporations to file as religious corpo-
rations because of the special treatment accorded them. It is naive to
believe that religious corporations, solely because of their classification
as "religious," are free of the vices that plague all other aspects of or-
ganized society, vices that the attotney general was empowered to rem-
edy under common and statutory law. 147 Moreover, the reluctance (or
refusal) of the courts to define what constitutes a "religion' 4 makes
the choice of chartering a corporation as one with a religious purpose
particularly appealing.
Exemption from supervision by the attorney general favors corpo-
rations choosing to incorporate under the new Religious Corporations
Law. This favoritism is contrary to the establishment clause of the
First Amendment which "'requires the state to be a neutral in its rela-
tions with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not
require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be
used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.' ",149
III. An Alternative
In order to reconcile the conflicting demands of the establishment
and free exercise clauses, a new compromise should be sought between
144. See Statement of L. Pfeffer, supra note 8, at 14.
145. There is no evidence that any abuse of the attorney general's power took place in
the short time that the prior version of § 9230 was in effect. The only actions taken in that
time were under § 9505; in those suits a California superior court upheld all actions taken by
the attorney general. The appeal to the United States Supreme Court on the ground of
unconstitutionality of the statute was thrice denied certiorari. See note 135 supra.
146. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 9130 (West Supp. 1982). The articles of incorporation must
state merely that the corporation is organized "primarily or exclusively for religious pur-
poses." Id
147. Churches today are big business. In 1977, 43 denominations reported contributions
exceeding $6.2 billion. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 55 (99th ed. 1978). See also Rakay & Sugarman, supra note 47; Note, supra
note 15.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); notes 39-47 and accompany-
ing text supra. See also Hitchcock, The Supreme Court and Religion: Historical Overview and
Future Prognosis, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 183, 202 (1980).
149. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 218 (1963) (quoting Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)) (emphasis added).
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the two versions of section 9230 put forward by the California Legisla-
ture. This new compromise, in order to satisfy both clauses, must:
(1) find the appropriate means to carry out a valid and compelling
state interest in protecting the public from fraud while invading First
Amendment freedoms as little as possible, (2) find the appropriate
means so as not to entangle government excessively in the activities or
operations of the religious corporation, and (3) remain neutral in the
treatment of religious corporations so as not to favor religious over sec-
ular corporations.15
Because the new compromise must resolve the extent to which reli-
gious corporations must be exempt from the traditional charitable trust
supervisory powers of the attorney general, it is logical to begin with a
regulatory scheme that creates no exemptions for religious corpora-
tions. We then determine how many or how few may be granted to
them without violating the neutrality and secular purposes test of the
establishment clause, and how many must be granted to avoid violating
the free exercise clause. It is necessary to start with no exemptions,
because the purpose of balancing the interests requires a determination
of their relative importance.
The common law allowed the attorney general the same power to
investigate and to supervise religious organizations as he was allowed
with regard to all nonprofit corporations under his general power of
charitable trust supervision. 5' This law was codified in repealed sec-
tion 9505,152 the precursor to both versions of section 9230. The origi-
nal section 9230 was the state's attempt to narrow this power with
regard to religious corporations, in recognition of the unique constitu-
tional considerations involved in the regulation of churches and reli-
gious organizations as opposed to other nonprofit corporations.
Although the powers granted in that version were substantially less
stringent for religious corporations than for general nonprofit corpora-
150. While some commentators have urged the application of a strict neutrality approach
to the religion clauses, see, e.g., P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 112 (1962), the
Supreme Court has held that, at least under certain conditions, the state must make special
provisions to relieve religious liberties from restrictions imposed by generally legitimate gov-
ernmental regulations. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Thus, for example, the
Court in Sherbert compelled South Carolina to provide unemployment benefits to claimants
who would not accept available work because of their unwillingness to work on their sab-
bath. Id at 410.
Adherence to the principle of strict neutrality carries with it the potential for serious
infringement of free exercise rights. For example, application of the strict neutrality ap-
proach would have required the Court to invalidate all Sunday closing laws, which it did not
do in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), or in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 852 (1978).
151. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
152. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9505 (West 1977) (repealed 1980). For the full text of the sec-
tion, see note 14 supra.
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tions, 153 opponents forcefully argued that the law gave overly broad
discretion and power to the attorney general to investigate the financial
practices of religious corporations. 54 In the revised section, the legisla-
ture effectively removed the attorney general's civil fraud enforcement
powers, thereby removing the most important legal impediment to
fraudulent activities on the part of religious corporations or their of-
ficers or directors. While the present section cannot provoke com-
plaints of violation of the free exercise clause, it does favor religious
over secular corporations, in violation of the establishment clause.
This note proposes a solution that would allow the attorney gen-
eral to retain the power to investigate and prosecute religious corpora-
tions for civil fraud. The compromise would impose strict limitations
on the attorney general's power to initiate investigations into the
financial affairs of religious corporations, but would not substantially
change his power under the original version to act once a violation has
been found. Under this proposal, the attorney general would no longer
be free to decide independently what constituted reasonable grounds to
believe that violations of the Religious Corporations Law had oc-
curred. The investigation could begin only after a church member (not
limited by the definition of "member" provided by the California Cor-
porations Code)' 55 filed a complaint with the attorney general. Before
proceeding with an investigation, the attorney general would be re-
quired to bring the complaint and any other evidence available before
a superior court judge. The judge would then decide whether or not
there existed reasonable cause to believe a violation of the laws had
occurred. In addition to this restriction on the attorney general's power
to initiate an investigation, the attorney general would be required to
report to the superior court at regular intervals. If at any time the court
determined that reasonable cause no longer existed, it could order the
investigation terminated.'56 "By barring the state from beginning on
153. See Abbott & Kornblum, supra note 2, at 790.
154. See, e.g., Note, supra note 15.
155. For a definition of "members" as provided by the California Corporations Code,
see notes 95-99 and accompanying text supra.
156. The author of this note has drafted a model statute to replace § 9230:
(a) Upon determination by a judge of the superior court that the Attorney General has
reasonable grounds to believe that the following condition or conditions have occurred or do
exist, the Attorney General may, by order of the court, examine a corporation to determine
whether:
(1) The corporation fails to qualify as a religious corporation under this part; or
(2) There is or has been any fraudulent activity in connection with the corporation's
property; or
(3) Any corporate property is or has been improperly diverted for the personal benefit
of any person; or
(4) Property solicited and received from the general public based upon a representa-
tion that it would be used for a limited or specific purpose other than the general support of
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its own initiative an investigation into a cult or religion, and by requir-
ing the involvement of an impartial magistrate to rule on the grounds
for investigation, freedom of religion can be ensured without depriving
citizens of protection against fraud."'
15 7
Similar judicial supervision should be placed on the attorney gen-
eral's power to appoint a receiver to manage the corporation's assets.
The power of the receiver to subpoena church records and to control
the disposition of church assets should be limited to the particular vio-
lation(s) found. Normal operations of the corporation must be allowed
to continue. If directors or officers are found to be perpetrating civil
fraud on the church and the public, the individuals should be removed
from their positions and replaced as soon as possible to allow the cor-
poration to resume normal operations. The power of the receiver
should last no longer than the time it takes the directors or the church
members to replace those responsible for the violations. At that point,
the attorney general would be free to continue an action for restitution
against the violators without further interruption of normal church
operations.
By restricting the discretion of the attorney general to interefere
with the religious operations of religious corporations, the state could
the corporation's religious activities, has been improperly used in a manner inconsistent with
the stated purpose for which the property was solicited; or
(5) There has been a substantial diversion of corporate assets from stated corporate
purposes.
(b) The Attorney General shall report to the superior court at regular intervals as set by the
court, and the court shall, on the basis of such reports, determine whether reasonable cause
under this Section still exists. If the court determines that reasonable cause no longer exists,
the Attorney General shall cease its examination of the corporation.
(c) Such examination shall respect privileges enumerated in Division 8 (commencing with
Section 900) of the Evidence Code and shall protect the confidential nature of membership
lists by using such lists only in connection with the examination and any subsequent court
proceedings resulting from such examination. In addition, such examination shall not un-
necessarily interfere with normal operations and religious observances of the corporation.
(d) Any person qualified to bring an action under Section 9141 or 9142 may petition the
court upon belief that a violation of subdivision (c) has occurred. Upon determination of
the court that the Attorney General has violated subdivison (c), the court may order the
Attorney General to cease such violation, or it may order that the examination authorized
under subdivison (a) cease.
(e) Upon a determination by the superior court that reasonable cause exists, the Attorney
General may institute an action in the name of the state:
(I) To establish that the corporation fails to qualify as a religious corporation under
this part, and if a court so finds, it shall enter an order that the corporation no longer operate
as a religious corporation under this part.
(2) To correct any wrongful activity which has taken place in connection with or as a
result of any condition or conditions set forth in paragraph (2), (3), (4) or (5) of subdivison
(a).
157. When Religion GoesAwry, Richmond, Cal. Independent & Gazette, June 15, 1980,
at 10, col. 1.
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demonstrate that it had chosen the least offensive means.158 The touch-
stone of the regulation would be precision, with narrowly drawn stan-
dards closely related to a permissible state interest-the protection of
the public from fraud.'59 This would preclude the free exercise com-
plaints against the original version of section 9230.160
By allowing the attorney general to retain his investigatory powers,
the primary effect of the legislation would no longer be to benefit reli-
gious corporations. Corporations would no longer be encouraged to
file as religious because of the special treatment accorded religious cor-
porations. The purpose of the regulation would be secular: the protec-
tion of the public from fraud. Governmental entanglement would be
kept to a minimum because of court supervision of the attorney general
and the restricted use of receiverships. Therefore, there would no
longer be a violation of the establishment clause.
Conclusion
In all other segments of corporate activity, commercial and chari-
table, the public is afforded protection from the fraudulent practices of
corporations and their officers and directors. In the area of nonprofit
activity, the attorney general has been the sole champion of the public
trust. The California Legislature, by enacting the current revision of
section 9230, has left the public trust without effective protection from
the fraudulent practices of officers and directors of religious corpora-
tions. Now, with the billions of dollars of donations made annually to
religious corporations, the only safeguard of the public interest in the
money donated is the good faith of the recipient church. Public ac-
countability for those funds should not rest in the discretion of the very
people likely to be violating the public trust. The attorney general must
have effective power to protect and to enforce the public interest in
funds solicited for religious purposes. The California Legislature must
make one more effort to accommodate the conflicting claims in this
area by reinstating the attorney general's civil fraud enforcement pow-
ers, this time with greater restrictions on the discretion of the attorney
general to act, thereby protecting the strong interest in religious liberty.
158. For a discussion of the meaning of "least offensive means." see notes 68-71 and
accompanying text supra.
159. People v. Fogelson, 21 Cal. 3d 158, 577 P.2d 677, 145 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1978). See
also notes 83-85 and accompanying text supra.
160. For a discussion of the free exercise complaints, see notes 86-100 and accompanying
text supra.
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